Effects of NGNs on market definition by Pereira, João Paulo
_. --""-
 
Á. Rocha et al. (Eds.): Advances in Information Systems and Technologies, AISC 206, pp. 939–949. 
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-36981-0_88 © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013 
 
Effects of NGNs on Market Definition 
João Paulo Ribeiro Pereira 
School of Technology and Management, Polytechnic Institute of Bragança (IPB), Portugal 
jprp@ipb.pt 
Abstract. Historically, electronic communications networks were built to 
support specific services. For example, fixed and mobile telephone networks 
were developed to support voice telephone calls, whereas cable networks, 
satellites, and over-the-air broadcasts were built to support television services 
(unidirectional linear video). However, these communications networks are 
currently incorporating new technology and are rapidly evolving into multi-
service networks that support voice, video, and data over a single, fully 
integrated communications platform. NGNs provide to customer access to a 
large range of services, leading to the increase of the bandwidth demand - For 
example, if customers encounter their demand on a single network, a triple play 
product, the bandwidth demand for that network will increase. Moreover, the 
migration to NGN may require upgrades to the infrastructure to provide 
sufficient service quality. The entry of new competitors can be based on the 
resale of services from the incumbent, on building up their own infrastructures, 
on renting unbundled infrastructure from incumbents, or, on the combination of 
the above elements. The availability of these options to competitors and price 
definition are generally determined by regulatory policies. So, the introduction 
of NGNs by telecommunication network operators obligates the national 
regulators adapt their access regulation regimes to the new technological 
conditions. Regulation and/or promotion of competition by regulatory measures 
need to be analyzed and compared. So, in this paper we explore the role of 
competition policy and regulation.  
Keywords: NGNs, Broadband Access Networks, Telecommunication network 
operators, policy and regulation. 
1 Introduction 
New applications and greater Internet use have increased the demand for broadband 
connections. The traditional copper-based access networks will not be capable of 
supporting this increase in traffic for much longer. There will come a time when 
existing access networks can no longer meet increasing customer expectations. As a 
result of the introduction of NGNs, operators need to upgrade their access networks 
because in several cases existing access networks can no longer meet increasing 
customer expectations. Evolving consumer expectations will require changes to the 
existing access network – next generation access. However, existing technologies 
faces some difficulties and are not ready for large-scale roll-out yet [1, 2]. In the case 
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of DSL technologies, the great majority of operators with copper networks are 
improving their networks, making investments to deploy fiber optics closer to 
customers and offering higher-speed access, which is required for new emerging 
services (reducing the distance between fiber and the users.). However, the bandwidth 
of DSL technology is depend of the distance, and is currently limited to 16 Mbps for 
ADSL2 solution and 52 Mbps for VDSL solution - Where loop lengths are 
sufficiently short, either to the central office or to the cabinet, VDSL will often 
represent the preferred price/performance choice in the near to medium term. HFC 
operators of cable TV networks have to invest in return link capabilities, bandwidth 
shared by users. Like DSL, HFC technology need to reduce the distance between fiber 
and the users. Fiber solutions, particularly Passive Optical Networks (e.g. FTTCab, 
FTTC, FTTB, FTTH), provide downstream bandwidths up to 622 Mbps and high 
distance range (up to 20km). However, the deployment involves relative high 
construction costs (particularly trench and ducts – civil works). PLC uses the power 
supply system, but there are some unsolved problems with interference and range.  
Additionally, the power network operators would have to invest significant sums in 
their infrastructure. Mobile telephony networks currently are being improved by 
setting up UMTS (384 kbps), HSDPA (2 Mbps), and LTE (up to 100 Mbps). 
However, UMTS and HSDPA technologies will not provide sufficient bandwidth in 
the near future to be regarded as a competitive network for triple play bundles and 
other applications demanding high bandwidth. Some broadband wireless access 
technologies offer promising opportunities with speeds comparable with fixed 
solutions. 
2 Challenges to Regulation 
The selection of the optimum technological solution for an NGA network depends 
upon the business model and ambitions, as well as the current position of the operator 
[3-6]. New technologies are creating new possibilities for last-mile competition, 
although the last mile continues to represent a market segment with high initial cost 
and low marginal cost in which only a limited number of telecommunications 
companies find it cost-effective to create and maintain network infrastructure [7]. 
The access network is usually the most expensive component in terms of capital 
investment (specifically passive infrastructure) and OA&M costs. Of the several 
costs, civil engineering costs are greatest when it is necessary to run a new fiber or 
copper connection to the cabinet, building, or home. Moreover, access to existing 
infrastructure, such as the ducts of the incumbent or other market players or sewage 
pipes, is critically important to avoid digging. For [8], a local loop network can be 
divided into three main layers or segments: a service layer and two infrastructure 
layers (see Figure 1. ). Layer 1 includes passive infrastructures, such ducts and cables, 
and requires the greatest investment. Layer 2 consists of active infrastructures, such as 
the technical installations at the end of the fibers that send, receive, and manage the 
optical signals. Layer 3 includes several services that consumers buy from 
telecommunication operators. 
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Fig. 1. Network layers [8, 9] 
The arrival of NGAN has implications for the competitive conditions in access 
markets. In the access network, the challenges posed to the implementation of loop 
unbundling by the migration to VSDL and by FTTB/FTTH raise serious questions 
regarding how it might best be achieved that remain unanswered [7]. Experimentation 
in different countries is likely to provide insight into whether some combination of 
access to street cabinets (sub-loop unbundling), rights of way, ducts, and/or building 
wiring might be sufficient to maintain the effectiveness of loop unbundling and 
shared access as a ladder-of-investment complement to bitstream access. 
Typically, without regulation, the resulting market outcome is likely to be an under 
provision of broadband services in sparsely populated regions and an overprovision in 
metropolitan areas [8]. Under provision may result from the high fixed costs 
associated with the network deployment if demand is too low. On the contrary, 
overprovision might be due to network duplication, which is a likely result in regions 
where deployment costs are low.  
2.1 Competition in Next Generation Access 
The emergence of technologies enables the introduction of new services, and opens 
up new revenue sources. While previously the main value of telecom was to realize 
simple communication between people, nowadays several new elements are added 
including mobility, personalization, portability, higher quality, etc. [10]. So, the offer 
of new services such as content, games and other broadband services, involves a 
number of business players (also known as actors). These players include not only 
traditional telecom roles (service operator, network operator), but also players from 
other industries (e.g. content, IT, consumer devices, etc.). Each player can represent 
several roles (for example, in the first scenario presented in Figure 2, the network 
operator acts as a service operator and in the second scenario they are different 
players. These changes have also raised the significance of the regulatory role. 
Figure 2 show two basic service provisioning models. In the first scenario, the 
network operator (which acts as service operator) and the content provider are the two 
main business players. The network operator is responsible for the correct 
provisioning of contents (e.g. downloads of music, games and videos, data, …) to the 
subscriber. In this business model structure, the contents are created by the content 
producer and sell to the subscriber by the network operator. The network operator is 
responsible for the provisioning of the bandwidth that the service operator offers to 
the subscriber. In the second scenario, the user buys services from the service operator 
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and thus subscribes for telecommunication services. Service operator acts as the main 
responsible player towards the subscriber. In order to reach its customers, and provide 
them with services (like voice and video telephony, Internet access, value-added 
services etc.), service operator needs to buy network access and transport services 
from the network operator. Network operator is a player who operates both access and 
core portions of a network infrastructure. In this scenario, network operator is the 
responsible for the network equipment purchase and maintenance cost, and service 
operator for the management costs. 
 
Fig. 2. Business models: basic service provision [11] 
For example, [12] argues that European mobile operators must separate the 
network operator and service operator businesses to face the diminution voice 
revenues (because of the increasing competition and consequently the reduction of the 
prices). Network operators are extending their network coverage and capacity, 
whereas service operators promote new services that are more profitable and more 
attractive to the customers (e.g., providing new and advanced value-added data and 
content services such as rich video and audio, games and m-commerce).  
2.2 Market Situation 
Despite the key objective of the EU is to promote investment in new infrastructures 
[13], this goal has not been fulfilled in Europe. A high level of investment is a strong 
prerequisite for building networks that permit the provision of emerging broadband 
services. Therefore, whereas entrants have the theoretical alternative of building 
copper networks, it is not likely to happen. The strategic selection scope for 
deployment is, therefore, limited to the decision of which type of FTTH to deploy. A 
key decision in FTTH deployment is how far from the subscriber the access 
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node/switch should be placed. Under structural separation, the incumbent generally 
sells wholesale services to other providers, who then market final services to the 
users. That is, the infrastructure access charges shape the final prices [14]. 
Table 1 shows the broadband access lines market share. The market share of the 
incumbent fixed operators since July 2003 has followed a downward trend which is 
now stabilizing around 44% of the broadband market. 
Table 1. Fixed broadband lines - operator market shares at EU level and PT, 2006 - 2010 
(Source: EC) 
Level Operator Jul-06 Jan-07 Jul-07 Jan-08 Jul-08 Jan-09 Jul-09 Jan-10 Jul-10 
EU 
Incumbents 47,7% 46,9% 46,8% 46,1% 45,7% 45,5% 45,2% 45,0% 44,0% 
New entrants 52,3% 53,1% 53,2% 53,9% 54,3% 54,5% 54,8% 55,0% 56,0% 
PT 
Incumbents 72,1% 71,1% 70,1% 39,7% 39,1% 40,6% 41,9% 43,0% 45,9% 
New entrants 27,9% 28,9% 29,9% 60,3% 60,9% 59,4% 58,1% 57,0% 54,1% 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the DSL market share evolution by type of operator (incumbent 
and new entrants) in the DSL market (Portugal and EU) - trend in the % of DSL lines 
provided by incumbent fixed operators. The incumbents' share of the DSL market 
stabilizes around 55% in the EU level, decreasing since 2005. However, the figure 
and the report of EC [15] shows that in Portugal the market share of the incumbent 
operator continued to increase since July 2008. The new entrants' market share 
decreased in the last year for both non-DSL lines and DSL lines.  
In EU cable market, new entrants share was 96.5 % in January 2011 (96.9 % in 
2010) and incumbents market share only 3.5 % (3.1 % in 2010). The Market share of 
the incumbent and new entrants in other internet technologies (not DSL or cable) is: 
90.6 % share for new entrants and 9.4 % for incumbent operators. 
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Fig. 3. DSL lines - operator market shares in DSL market: EU level and PT, (Source: EC) 
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3 Regulatory Options/Strategies for Access Networks in NGNs 
The advent of NGN (new network technologies, access infrastructures, and even 
services) has changed the concept of telecommunication networks and has profound 
implications for operators and regulators. The definition of policies and regulations 
for competition in the access networks constitute one of the most debated issues in 
telecommunications today. The regulation of telecommunications networks and 
services is seen as a necessary requirement in most countries to meet government 
objectives and to ensure public interest [16]. Regulation is fundamental to generate 
positive welfare effects where markets alone would not tend to perfect competition.  
But, as referred by [17], the major problem is how to measure these welfare effects, 
as they can occur as consumer surplus, producer surplus, societal gains (e.g., 
increased tax income, better working conditions, etc.). Their empirical study uses 
price situation to examine the welfare effects measured by the state of competition. 
They assumed that the increase of competition reduces prices in the market and that 
competition can also increase consumer welfare without reducing prices (achieved by 
innovation). Public policies should promote an efficient investment and competition 
in all markets (see Figure 4). 
Regulators face substantial challenges in dealing with the evolution of the technology 
of electronic communications networks from circuit switching to packet switching 
based on the IP. As would be expected, NGNs have different configuration which will 
have competitive and regulatory implications. However, operators and countries are 
approaching the migration to NGN differently. The migration to NGN changes the 
character of competition substantially and brings about the decoupling of the service 
(provision) from the network (transport) [18, 19]. Specifically, in an IP-based NGN, any 
network can provide any service, any network can simultaneously carry multiple 
services, and a service provider does not have to be a network operator (and vice versa).  
Regulators face the question of how to adapt to this changing competitive and dynamic 
environment in which many incumbents have announced or begun the migration to 
NGN as well as the implementation of optical access networks [18, 20]. The objective 
with the NGA access regulation has been to foster investment and innovation in a new 
and enhanced infrastructure while preserving a strong market competition [21]. 
 
Fig. 4. Policies effects [22] 
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The two main economic reasons that have been used to justify interventions in 
access networks are the beliefs that access networks constitute a natural monopoly for 
which competition is not feasible in principle and that regulation is, therefore, 
necessary to control monopoly power and to achieve universal service in which all (or 
most) users have the opportunity to affordably access the services of the network. The 
challenge of telecom operators to provide a profitable deployment of broadband 
services depends if is a high or a low competition area. In areas with high competition 
already exists competition between broadband network operators, and the main 
question is know the market share of all intervenient. However, in low competition 
areas high investments cost must be incurred to promote broadband. [3] argued that 
national or regional policy concerns can also affect NGA roll out. Without some type 
of intervention, there is the risk for a new digital divide, with urban customers on 
short loops being able to receive IPTV/multi-media services and HDTV while those 
in rural areas might not be able to receive such services. Therefore, the access 
network poses serious challenges to the regulator [7].  
The question then becomes whether it is more important to stimulate investment or 
to ensure competition. Investment in network quality is important for consumers 
because it provides access to both better quality and speed to services, such as Web 
browsing and email, and services that require more bandwidth, such as video. 
Investment in network quality also improves the service value for consumers and 
attracts new consumers to the market. The promotion of competition in the 
telecommunications market means supporting competition not only among 
incumbents’ competitors, but also between incumbents and their competitors [23].  
Therefore, there are two major options for access regulation [3, 20]: temporary or 
permanent deregulation (i.e., the removal of sector-specific rules and regulations) or 
mandated access (i.e., the obligation to grant access to bottleneck facilities at a 
regulated price and quality). Deregulation increases investment incentives, as it 
overcomes the “truncating problem” and allows above-normal profits. However, in 
the absence of alternative infrastructures or in areas of low population density under 
limited competition or the threat of entry into the upstream market, an integrated 
incumbent might leverage its market power to competitive downstream segments. 
Normally, the deregulation in NGNs may be applicable in competitive normal-speed 
markets. In the case of high-speed markets, deregulation incentives investment, but 
exist the risk that operators’ market power is likely to increase market concentration 
in the long run.  
For NRAs, one request of decisive importance is if they must foster service-based 
competition in the first phase of liberalization or to focus on infrastructure-based 
competition. This decision (infrastructure or service-based) would lead to lower 
prices, more differentiated and innovative products and improved services for 
consumers [17]. 
When access is available at different levels of the incumbent’s network, new 
entrants will be able invest in the infrastructure gradually as sufficient economies of 
scale became achievable [24] - This concept is the ladder of infrastructure 
competition. This concept defends that new entrants (or access seekers) may enter the 
market offering broadband access by reselling the wholesale services of the 
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incumbent operator (requires least investment) where they only cover minor elements 
of the value chain (Figure 5). When the number of customer grows and financial 
means become available, the operator move on to higher rungs of the ladder [17, 25]. 
Next, new entrants need to building their own infrastructure and acquiring only the 
residual infrastructure from the incumbent's wholesale department. This includes a 
move for the operators from service to infrastructure-based competition. 
The migration to NGAN has raised a range of issues related to building wiring and 
infrastructure sharing. The deployment strategies for operators and entrants are 
completely different. In addition, parameters, such as existent infrastructure, 
geographical characteristics, infrastructure renting costs, and consumer willingness to 
pay, influence the definition of the strategy. So, telecommunication operators can 
select among a set of deployment strategies that are characterized by path dependency 
and diminishing usage of the legacy copper loop [16]. The range of the selection 
space is based upon how much of the copper they use and, consequently, how far 
toward the customer they deploy new fiber. In the final step, operators replace all of 
the copper with FTTH. Within that scenario, FTTH can be implemented as either 
active Ethernet or passive optical networks, although most incumbent operators tend 
to select PON.  
 
Fig. 5. Ladder of investment [24, 26] 
The migration to NGAN has raised a range of issues related to building wiring and 
infrastructure sharing. The deployment strategies for operators and entrants are 
completely different. In addition, parameters, such as existent infrastructure, 
geographical characteristics, infrastructure renting costs, and consumer willingness to 
pay, influence the definition of the strategy. So, telecommunication operators can 
select among a set of deployment strategies that are characterized by path dependency 
and diminishing usage of the legacy copper loop [16]. The range of the selection 
space is based upon how much of the copper they use and, consequently, how far 
toward the customer they deploy new fiber. In the final step, operators replace all of 
the copper with FTTH. Within that scenario, FTTH can be implemented as either 
active Ethernet or passive optical networks, although most incumbent operators tend 
to select PON.  
The strategy of a new entrant in an access network that does not have an 
infrastructure can be one of the following three alternatives [13, 16]: (1) Renting 
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infrastructure (i.e. conduit, cable, equipment, etc.) from other operators and offering 
only services (infrastructure sharing); (2) Deploying a new infrastructure; or (3) Not 
participating at all (see Figure 6). Figure 6 also shows the deployment strategies 
commonly used by incumbent and new entrants. 
Regulators must decide whether to promote competition on the basis of a single 
infrastructure with regulated access (service competition) or to encourage the build-up 
of competing, parallel infrastructures (infrastructure competition) [27]. Then, is 
important create the right incentive for operators to make an efficient build/buy 
choice and define the appropriate pricing principles. To obtain economic efficiency, a 
regulator should [24]: (1) Encourage the use of existing infrastructure of the 
incumbent operator where this is economically desirable, avoiding inefficient 
duplication of infrastructure costs by new entrants (incentive to buy); and (2) 
Encourage investment in new infrastructure where this is economically justified by 
(1) new entrants investing in competing infrastructure, and (2) the incumbent operator 
upgrading and expanding its networks (incentive to build). 
In this context, the cost models are fundamental in the determination of the access 
price that can be used by regulators in the definition of wholesale prices. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Deployment strategies for incumbent operators and new entrants [9, 11] 
4 Conclusions 
The analysis of the broadband market suggests that where infrastructure competition 
exists, as in DSL and wireless broadband, service providers will more aggressively 
price their offerings, driving down the access price for consumers. However, in the 
case of limited infrastructure competition, broadband access price remains high for 
consumers. Infrastructure competition between DSL, Cable and wireless solution, had 
a significant and positive impact on the broadband penetration. We verify that 
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opening access networks (and network elements) to competitive forces increases 
investment and the speed of development. Despite increasing competition, 
incumbents are maintaining their dominant position. More than 60% of all broadband 
subscriptions make use of incumbent’s broadband access infrastructure. In 
countries/regions where alternative technological platforms are not developed, the 
deployment of the DSL technology depends on the use of the networks infrastructures 
that are propriety of incumbent operators. To facilitate market entry of new 
competitors and develop competition in the access market, the regulatory authorities 
are focused on unbundled access to the local loop (fully unbundled local loop and 
shared access to the local loop) and on different forms of network access (bitstream 
and resale). 
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